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FEDERAL DEPOSiTORY
LAW L RARY

Juvenile Justice:
A Century of Change
As the
Nation
moves into
the 21st
century, the
reduction
of juvenile
crime, violence, and
victimization
constitutes one of
the most crucial challenges of the new millennium. To meet that
challenge, reliable information is essential. Juvenile Offenders and Victims: 1999 National
Report offers a comprehensive
overview of these pervasive problems
and the response of the juvenile justice
system. The National Report brings
together statistics from a variety of sources
on a wide array of topics, presenting the
information in clear, nontechnical text
enhanced by more than 350 easy-to-read
tables, graphs, and maps.
This Bulletin series is designed to give readers
quick, focused access to some of the most critical
findings from the wealth of data in the National Report.
Each Bulletin in the series highlights selected themes
at the forefront of juvenile justice policymaking and
extracts relevant National Report sections (including
selected graphs and tables).

Administrator's Message
In 1899, when the first proceeding of a juvenile court
convened in Chicago, it is unlikely that those in the
courtroom were aware of the momentous impact of
their actions. Yet, that beginning provided the foundation for how our Nation deals with juvenile offenders.
A century ago, the focus of the juvenile justice system
was on the juvenile offender-rather than the offense-and that remains largely true today. The juvenile
court system is based on the principle that youth are
developmentally different from adults and more

amenable to intervention. At its best, the juvenile
court balances rehabilitation and treatment with
appropriate sanctions-including incarceration,
when necessary.
The Illinois statute also gave the court jurisdiction
over dependent, neglected, and delinquent children.
This understanding of the link between child victimization, family disorder, and the potential for child
victims to become offenders without early and
effective intervention continues to be an important
part of the juvenile court philosophy.
This Bulletin provides a thorough, easily understood
description of the development of the juvenile justice
system in the United States. It also uses the most
current data available to look at where we are headed,
and it examines the recent trend of transferring certain
juvenile cases to adult criminal court.
Contrary to what some people believe, today's U.S.
juvenile justice system is not an "easy out" that gives
a meaningless slap on the wrist to violent youth. Nor
is it a breeding ground for gangs, drugs, and adult
crime. Instead, the juvenile justice system provides
youthful offenders and their victims with a comprehensive, yet balanced approach to justice. Probation,
treatment, and restitution are widely used. For most
juveniles who enter the system, this approach works:
54 percent of males and 73 percent of females never
return to juvenile court on a new referral.
Certainly, there are areas in the juvenile justice system
that need improvement. For example, the system
needs to prepare to handle more female offenders and
offenders under the age of 13, two groups whose
numbers are increasing. Still, the roots of the juvenile
justice system remain strong and need to be supported
by all those committed to improving the lives of our
children. At OJJDP, we intend to continue our efforts
to strengthen the juvenile justice system and achieve
the goals for which the juvenile court was first
established.
Shay Bilchik
Administrator

OJJDP

The juvenile justice system was founded on the
concept of rehabilitation through individualized justice

Early in U.S. history, children
who broke the law were treated
the same as adult criminals
Throughout the late 18th century,
"infants" below the age of reason
(traditionally age 7) were presumed
to be incapable of criminal intent
and were, therefore, exempt from
prosecution and punishment. Children as young as 7, however, could
stand trial in criminal court for offenses committed and, if found
guilty, could be sentenced to prison
or even to death.
The 19th-century movement that
led to the establishment of the juvenile court in the U.S. had its roots in
16th-century European educational

John Augustus-planting the
seeds of juvenile probation
(1847)
"I bailed nineteen boys, from 7 to 15
years of age, and in bailing them it
was understood, and agreed by the
court, that their cases should be
continued from term to term for several months, as a season of probation; thus each month at the calling
of the docket, I would appear in
court, make my report, and thus the
cases would pass on for 5 or 6
months. At the expiration of this
term, twelve of the boys were
brought into court at one time, and
the scene formed a striking and
highly pleasing contrast with their
appearance when first arraigned.
The judge expressed much pleasure as well as surprise at their appearance, and remarked, that the
object of law had been accomplished and expressed his cordial
approval of my plan to save and
reform ."
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reform movements. These earlier reform movements changed the perception of children from one of miniature adults to one of persons with
less than fully developed moral and
cognitive capacities.
As early as 1825, the Society for the
Prevention of Juvenile Delinquency
was advocating the separation of juvenile and adult offenders. Soon, facilities exclusively for juveniles
were established in most major cities. By mid-century, these privately
operated youth "prisons" were under criticism for various abuses.
Many States then took on the responsibility of operating juvenile
facilities.
The first juvenile court in this
country was established in Cook
County, Illinois, in 1899
Illinois passed the Juvenile Court
Act of 1899, which established the
Nation's first juvenile court. The
British doctrine of parens patriae
(the State as parent) was the rationale for the right of the State to intervene in the lives of children in a
manner different from the way it intervenes in the lives of adults. The
doctrine was interpreted to mean
that, because children were not of
full legal capacity, the State had the
inherent power and responsibility
to provide protection for children
whose natural parents were not providing appropriate care or supervision. A key element was the focus
on the welfare of the child. Thus,
the delinquent child was also seen
as in need of the court's benevolent
intervention.

Juvenile courts flourished for the
first half of the 20th century
By 1910, 32 States had established
juvenile courts and/or probation
services. By 1925, all but two States
had followed suit. Rather than
merely punishing delinquents for
their crimes, juvenile courts sought
to turn delinquents into productive
citizens-through treatment.
The mission to help children in
trouble was stated clearly in the
laws that established juvenile
courts. This benevolent mission led
to procedural and substantive differences between the juvenile and
criminal justice systems.
During the next 50 years, most juvenile courts had exclusive original
jurisdiction over all youth under age
18 who were charged with violating
criminal laws. Only if the juvenile
court waived its jurisdiction in a
case could a child be transferred to
criminal court and tried as an adult.
Transfer decisions were made on a
case-by-case basis using a "best
interests of the child and public"
standard, and were thus within the
realm of individualized justice.
The focus on offenders and not
offenses, on rehabilitation and
not punishment, had substantial
procedural impact
Unlike the criminal justice system,
where district attorneys select
cases for trial, the juvenile court
controlled its own intake. And unlike criminal prosecutors, juvenile
court intake considered extra-legal
as well as legal factors in deciding
how to handle cases. Juvenile court
intake also had discretion to handle
cases informally, bypassing judicial
action.
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Some juvenile codes emphasize prevention and treatment goals,
some stress punishment, and others seek a balanced approach
Philosophical goals stated in juvenile code purpose clauses, 1997
Prevention/
Both prevention/diversion/
diversion/treatment
Punishment
treatment and punishment
Arizona*
Dist. of Columbia
Kentucky
Massachusetts
North Carolina
Ohio
South Carolina
Vermont
West Virginia

Arkansas
Georgia
Hawaii
Illinois
Iowa
Louisiana
Michigan
Missouri
Rhode Island

Alabama
Alaska
California
Colorado
Connecticut
Delaware
Florida
Idaho
Indiana
Kansas
Maryland
Maine
Minnesota
Mississippi
Montana
Nebraska

Nevada
New Hampshire
New Jersey
New Mexico
New York
North Dakota
Oklahoma
Oregon
Pennsylvania
Tennessee
Texas
Utah
Virginia
Washington
Wisconsin
Wyoming

•

Most States seek to protect the interests of the child, the family, the community, or some combination of the three.

•

In 17 States, the purpose clause incorporates the language of the balanced
and restorative justice philosophy, emphasizing offender accountability, public safety, and competency development.

•

Purpose clauses also address court issues such as fairness, speedy trials,
and even coordination of services. In nearly all States, the code also includes protections of the child's constitutional and statutory rights.

*Arizona's statutes and court rules did not contain a purpose clause; however, the issue is
addressed in case law.
Source: Authors' adaptation ofTorbet and Szymanski's State legislative responses to violent juvenile crime: 1996- 97 update [unpublished background research].

I

In the courtroom, juvenile court
hearings were much less formal
than criminal court proceedings. In
this benevolent com t-with the express purpose of protecting children-due process protections afforded criminal defendants were
deemed unnecessary. In the early juvenile courts, and even in some to
this day, attorneys for the State and
the youth are not considered essential to the operation of the system,
especially in less serious cases.
DECEMBER 1999

A range of dispositional options was
available to a judge wanting to help
rehabilitate a child. Regardless of offense, outcomes ranging from warnings to probation supervision to
training school confinement could
be part of the treatment plan.
Dispositions were tailored to "the
best interests of the child ." Treatment lasted until the child was
"cured" or became an adult (age
21), whichever came first.

As public confidence in the
treatment model waned, due
process protections were
introduced

In the 1950's and 1960's, many came
to question the ability of the juvenile court to succeed in rehabilitating delinquent youth. The treatment
techniques available to juvenile justice professionals never reached the
desired levels of effectiveness. Although the goal of rehabilitation
through individualized justice-the
basic philosophy of the juvenile justice system-was not in question,
professionals were concerned about
the growing number of juveniles
institutionalized indefinitely in the
name of treatment.
In a series of decisions beginning in
the 1960's, the U.S. Supreme Court
required that juvenile courts become more formal-more like criminal courts. Formal hearings were
now required in waiver situations,
and delinquents facing possible confinement were given protection
against self-incrimination and rights
to receive notice of the charges
against them, to present witnesses,
to question witnesses, and to have
an attorney. Proof "beyond a reasonable doubt" rather than merely "a
preponderance of evidence" was
now required for an adjudication.
The Supreme Court, however, still
held that there were enough "differences of substance between the
criminal and juvenile courts ... to
hold that a jury is not required in
the latter." (See Supreme Court decisions later in this Bulletin.)
Meanwhile Congress, in the Juvenile
Delinquency Prevention and Control
Act of 1968, recommended that children charged with noncriminal (status) offenses be handled outside
the court system. A few years later,
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Congress passed the Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act
of 1974, which as a condition for
State participation in the Formula
Grants program required deinstitutionalization of status offenders and
nonoffenders as well as the separation of juvenile delinquents from
adult offenders. (In the 1980 amendments to the 1974 Act, Congress
added a requirement that juveniles
be removed from adult jail and
lockup facilities.) Community-based
programs, diversion, and deinstitutionalization became the banners of
juvenile justice policy in the 1970's.

In the 1980's, the pendulum began
to swing toward law and order
During the 1980's, the public perceived that serious juvenile crime
was increasing and that the system
was too lenient with offenders. Although there was substantial
misperception regarding increases
in juvenile crime, many States responded by passing more punitive
laws. Some laws removed certain
classes of offenders from the juvenile justice system and handled
them as adult criminals in criminal
court. Others required the juvenile
justice system to be more like the
criminal justice system and to treat
certain classes of juvenile offenders
as criminals but in juvenile court.
As a result, offenders charged with
certain offenses are excluded from
juvenile court jurisdiction or face
mandatory or automatic waiver to
criminal court. In some States, concurrent jurisdiction provisions give
prosecutors the discretion to file
certain juvenile cases directly in
criminal court rather than juvenile
court. In some States, some adjudicated juvenile offenders face mandatory sentences.

4

The core requirements of the Juvenile Justice and Delinquency
Prevention Act primarily address custody issues
The Juvenile Justice and Delinquency
Prevention Act of 1974, as amended,
(the Act) establishes four custodyrelated requirements:
• The "deinstitutionalization of status
offenders and nonoffenders" requirement (1974) specifies that juveniles
not charged with acts that would be
crimes tor adults "shall not be
placed in secure detention facilities
or secure correctional facilities."
• The "sight and sound separation"
requirement (1974) specifies that,
"juveniles alleged to be or found to
be delinquent and [status offenders and nonoffenders] shall not be
detained or confined in any institution in which they have contact
with adult persons incarcerated
because they have been convicted
of a crime or are awaiting trial on
criminal charges." This requires
that juvenile and adult inmates
cannot see each other and no conversation between them is possible.
•

The "jail and lockup removal" requirement (1980} states that juveniles shall not be detained or confined in adult jails or lockups.
There are, however, several exceptions to the jail and lockup removal requirement. Regulations
implementing the Act exempt juveniles held in secure adult facilities
if the juvenile is being tried as a
criminal for a felony or has been
convicted as a criminal felon. In
addition, there is a 6-hour grace
period that allows adult jails and
lockups to hold delinquents temporarily until other arrangements can
be made. Jails and lockups in rural
areas may hold delinquents up to
24 hours under certain conditions.
Some jurisdictions have obtained
approval for separate juvenile detention centers that are collocated
with an adult jail or lockup facility.

•

The "disproportionate confinement
of minority youth" requirement
(1992) specifies that States determine the existence and extent of
the problem in their State and demonstrate efforts to reduce it where it
exists.
Regulations effective December 10,
1996, modify the Act's requirements in
several ways:
• Clarity the sight and sound separation requirement-in nonresidential
areas brief, accidental contact is
not a reportable violation.
• Permit time-phased use of nonresidential areas for both juveniles and
adults in collocated facilities.
•

Expand the 6-hour grace period to
include 6 hours both before and after court appearances.

•

Allow adjudicated delinquents to be
transferred to adult institutions once
they have reached the State's age
of full criminal responsibility, where
such transfer is expressly authorized by State law.

The revised regulations offer flexibility
to States in carrying out the Act's requirements. States must agree to comply with each requirement to receive
Formula Grants funds under the Act's
provisions. States must submit plans
outlining their strategy for meeting the
requirements and other statutory plan
requirements. Noncompliance with
core requirements results in the loss of
25% of the State's annual Formula
Grants program allocation.
As of 1998, 55 of 57 eligible States and
territories are participating in the Formula Grants program. Annual State
monitoring reports show that the vast
majority are in compliance with the requirements, either reporting no violations or meeting de minimis or other
compliance criteria.
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The 1990's have been a time of
unprecedented change as State
legislatures crack down on
juvenile crime
Five areas of change have emerged
as States passed laws designed to
crack down on juvenile crime. These
laws generally involve expanded eligibility for criminal court processing
and adult correctional sanctioning
and reduced confidentiality protections for a subset of juvenile offenders. Between 1992 and 1997, all but
three States changed laws in one or
more of the following areas:

•
•
•

Transfer provisions-Laws made
it easier to transfer juvenile offenders from the juvenile justice
system to the criminal justice
system (45 States).
Sentencing authority-Laws gave
criminal and juvenile courts expanded sentencing options (31
States).
Confidentiality-Laws modified
or removed traditional juvenile
court confidentiality provisions
by making records and proceedings more open (47 States).

In addition to these areas, there was
change relating to:

•
•

Victims rights-Laws increased
the role of victims of juvenile
crime in the juvenile justice process (22 States).
Correctional programming-As
a result of new transfer and sentencing laws, adult and juvenile
correctional administrators developed new programs .

The 1980's and 1990's have seen significant change in terms of treating
more juvenile offenders as criminals. Recently, States have been attempting to strike a balance in their
juvenile justice systems among sys-
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From 1992 through 1997, legislatures in 47 States and the District
of Columbia enacted laws that made their juvenile justice systems
more punitive

State
Alabama
Alaska
Arizona
Arkansas
California
Colorado
Connecticut
Delaware
D. of Columbia
Florida
Georgia
Hawaii
Idaho
Illinois
Indiana
Iowa
Kansas
Kentucky
Louisiana
Maine
Maryland
Massachusetts
Michigan
Minnesota
Mississippi
Missouri

Changes in
law or court rule*
T
T
T
T
T
T
T
T
T
T
T
T
T
T
T
T
T
T
T
T
T
T
T
T

s
s
s
s
s
s
s
s
s
s
s
s
s
s
s
s
s
s
s

c
c
c
c
c
c
c
c
c
c
c
c
c
c
c
c
c
c
c
c
c
c
c
c
c

State
Montana
Nebraska
Nevada
New Hampshire
New Jersey
New Mexico
New York
North Carolina
North Dakota
Ohio
Oklahoma
Oregon
Pennsylvania
Rhode Island
South Carolina
South Dakota
Tennessee
Texas
Utah
Vermont
Virginia
Washington
West Virginia
Wisconsin
Wyoming

Changes in
law or court rule*
T
T
T
T
T
T
T
T
T
T
T
T
T
T
T
T
T
T
T
T
T

s

c

s
s
s

c
c
c
c

s
s
s

c
c
c
c
c
c
c
c

s
s
s

c
c
c

s

c
c
c
c
c

s

*T =Transfer provisions, S = Sentencing authority, C = Confidentiality
Source: Authors' adaptation of Tarbet et al.'s State responses to serious and violent juvenile crime and Tarbet and Szymanski's State legislative responses to violent juvenile crime:
1996-97 update.

tern and offender accountability, offender competency development,
and community protection. Juvenile
code purpose clauses also incorporate restorative justice language (offenders repair the harm done to victims and communities and accept
responsibility for their criminal actions). Many States have added to
the purpose clauses of their juvenile
codes phrases such as:

•
•
•
•

Hold juveniles accountable for
criminal behavior.

•

Impose punishment consistent
with the seriousness of the
crime.

Provide effective deterrents .
Protect the public from criminal
activity.
Balance attention to offenders,
victims, and the community.

5

U.S. Supreme Court cases have had an impact on the
character and procedures of the juvenile justice system

The Supreme Court has made its
mark on juvenile justice

Issues arising from juvenile delinquency proceedings rarely come before the U.S. Supreme Court. Beginning in the late 1960's, however, the
Court decided a series of landmark
cases that dramatically changed the
character and procedures of the
juvenile justice system.
Kent v. United States
383 U.S. 541, 86 S.Ct. 1045 (1966)

In 1961, while on probation from an
earlier case, Morris Kent, age 16,
was charged with rape and robbery.
Kent confessed to the offense as
well as to several similar incidents.
Assuming that the District of Columbia juvenile court would consider
waiving jurisdiction to the adult system, Kent's attorney filed a motion
requesting a hearing on the issue of
jurisdiction.
The juvenile court judge did not
rule on this motion filed by Kent's
attorney. Instead, he entered a motion stating that the court was waiving jurisdiction after making a "full
investigation." The judge did not describe the investigation or the
grounds for the waiver. Kent was
subsequently found guilty in criminal court on six counts of housebreaking and robbery and sentenced to 30 to 90 years in prison.
Kent's lawyer sought to have the
criminal indictment dismissed, arguing that the waiver had been invalid.
He also appealed the waiver and
filed a writ of habeas corpus asking
the State to justify Kent's detention.
Appellate courts rejected both the
appeal and the writ, refused to scrutinize the judge's "investigation,"
and accepted the waiver as valid. In
appealing to the U.S. Supreme
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Court, Kent's attorney argued that
the judge had not made a complete
investigation and that Kent was denied constitutional rights simply because he was a minor.
The Court ruled the waiver invalid,
stating that Kent was entitled to a
hearing that measured up to "the essentials of due process and fair
treatment," that Kent's counsel
should have had access to all
records involved in the waiver, and
that the judge should have provided
a written statement of the reasons
for waiver.
Technically, the Kent decision applied only to D.C. courts, but its impact was more widespread. The
Court raised a potential constitutional challenge to parens patriae as
the foundation of the juvenile court.
In its past decisions, the Court had
interpreted the equal protection
clause of the 14th amendment to
mean that certain classes of people
could receive less due process if a
"compensating benefit" came with
this lesser protection. In theory, the
juvenile court provided less due
process but a greater concern for
the interests of the juvenile. The
Court referred to evidence that this
compensating benefit may not exist
in reality and that juveniles may receive the "worst of both worlds""neither the protection accorded to
adults nor the solicitous care and
regenerative treatment postulated
for children."
In re Gault
387 U.S. 1, 87 S.Ct. 1428 (1967)

Gerald Gault, age 15, was on probation in Arizona for a minor property
offense when, in 1964, he and a
friend made a crank telephone call
to an adult neighbor, asking her,
"Are your cherries ripe today?" and

"Do you have big bombers?" Identified by the neighbor, the youth were
arrested and detained.
The victim did not appear at the
adjudication hearing, and the court
never resolved the issue of whether
Gault made the "obscene" remarks.
Gault was committed to a training
school for the period of his minority. The maximum sentence for an
adult would have been a $50 fine or
2 months in jail.
An attorney obtained for Gault after
the trial filed a writ of habeas corpus that was eventually heard by
the U.S. Supreme Court. The issue
presented in the case was that
Gault's constitutional rights (to notice of charges, counsel, questioning
of witnesses, protection against selfincrimination, a transcript of the
proceedings, and appellate review)
were denied.
The Court ruled that in hearings
that could result in commitment to
an institution, juveniles have the
right to notice and counsel, to question witnesses, and to protection
against self-incrimination. The Court
did not rule on a juvenile's right to
appellate review or transcripts, but
encouraged the States to provide
those rights.
The Court based its ruling on the
fact that Gault was being punished
rather than helped by the juvenile
court. The Court explicitly rejected
the doctrine of parens patriae as the
founding principle of juvenile justice,
describing the concept as murky and
of dubious historical relevance. The
Court concluded that the handling
of Gault's case violated the due
process clause of the 14th amendment: "Juvenile court history has
again demonstrated that unbridled
discretion, however benevolently
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motivated, is frequently a poor substitute for principle and procedure."
In re Winship
397 U.S. 358, 90 S.Ct. 1068 (1970)

Samuel Winship, age 12, was
charged with stealing $112 from a
woman's purse in a store. A store
employee claimed to have seen
Winship running from the scene just
before the woman noticed the
money was missing; others in the
store stated that the employee was
not in a position to see the money
being taken.

Winship was adjudicated delinquent
and committed to a training school.
New York juvenile courts operated
under the civil court standard of a
"preponderance of evidence." The
court agreed with Winship's attorney that there was "reasonable
doubt" of Winship's guilt, but based
its ruling on the "preponderance" of
evidence.

juvenile court process. The Court
rejected lower court arguments that
juvenile courts were not required to
operate on the same standards as
adult courts because juvenile courts
were designed to "save" rather than
to "punish" children. The Court
ruled that the "reasonable doubt"
standard should be required in all
delinquency adjudications.

Upon appeal to the Supreme Court,
the central issue in the case was
whether "proof beyond a reasonable doubt" should be considered
among the "essentials of due process and fair treatment" required
during the adjudicatory stage of the

McKeiver v. Pennsylvania
403 U.S. 528, 91 S.Ct.1976 (1971)

Joseph McKeiver, age 16, was
charged with robbery, larceny, and
receiving stolen goods. He and 20 to
30 other youth allegedly chased 3

A series of U.S. Supreme Court decisions made juvenile courts more like criminal courts but maintained
some important differences
Breedv. Jones (1975)
Kent v. United States ( 1966)
Courts must provide the "essentials of due process" in transferring
juveniles to the adult system.

Waiver of a juvenile to criminal court
following adjudication in juvenile court
constitutes double jeopardy.

press may report juvenile court
proceedings under certain circumstances.

In re Gault ( 1967)
In hearings that could result in commitment to an institution, juveniles have
four basic constitutional rights.

Eddings v. Oklahoma (1982)*
Defendant's youthful age should be considered a mitigating factor in deciding
whether to apply the death penalty.

In delinquency matters, the State
must prove its case beyond a
reasonable doubt.

Schall v. Martin ( 1984)
Preventive "pretrial" detention of
juveniles is allowable under certain
circumstances.

Jury trials are not constitutionally
required in juvenile court hearings.
Minimum age for death penalty
is set at 16.

1965

1970

1975

1980

1985

1990

*For discussion of death penalty case decisions, see page 211 of Juvenile Offenders and Victims: 1999 National Report.
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youth and took 25 cents from them.
McKeiver met with his attorney for
only a few minutes before his adjudicatory hearing. At the hearing, his
attorney's request for a jury trial
was denied by the court. He was
subsequently adjudicated and
placed on probation.
The State supreme court cited recent decisions of the U.S. Supreme
Court that had attempted to include
more due process in juvenile court
proceedings without eroding the essential benefits of the juvenile court.
The State supreme court affirmed
the lower court, arguing that of all
due process rights, trial by jury is
most likely to "destroy the traditional
character of juvenile proceedings."
The U.S. Supreme Court found that
the due process clause of the 14th
amendment did not require jury trials in juvenile court. The impact of
the Court's Gault and Winship decisions was to enhance the accuracy
of the juvenile court process in the
fact-finding stage. In McKeiver, the
Court argued that juries are not
known to be more accurate than
judges in the adjudication stage and
could be disruptive to the informal
atmosphere of the juvenile court,
tending to make it more adversarial.
Breed v. Jones
421 U.S. 519, 95 S.Ct. 1779 (1975)

In 1970, Gary Jones, age 17, was
charged with armed robbery. Jones
appeared in Los Angeles juvenile
court and was adjudicated delinquent on the original charge and
two other robberies.
At the dispositional hearing, the
judge waived jurisdiction over the
case to criminal court. Counsel for
Jones filed a writ of habeas corpus,
arguing that the waiver to criminal
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court violated the double jeopardy
clause of the fifth amendment. The
court denied this petition, saying
that Jones had not been tried twice
because juvenile adjudication is not
a "trial" and does not place a youth
in jeopardy.
Upon appeal, the U.S. Supreme
Court ruled that an adjudication in
juvenile court, in which a juvenile is
found to have violated a criminal
statute, is equivalent to a trial in
criminal court. Thus, Jones had
been placed in double jeopardy. The
Court also specified that jeopardy
applies at the adjudication hearing
when evidence is first presented.
Waiver cannot occur after jeopardy
attaches.
Oklahoma Publishing Company

v. District Court in and for
Oklahoma City
480 U.S. 308, 97 S.Ct. 1045 (1977)

The Oklahoma Publishing Company
case involved a court order prohibiting the press from reporting the
name and photograph of a youth involved in a juvenile court proceeding. The material in question was
obtained legally from a source outside the court. The U.S. Supreme
Court found the court order to be
an unconstitutional infringement on
freedom of the press.
Smith v. Daily Mail Publishing
Company
443 U.S. 97, 99 S.Ct. 2667 (1979)

The Daily Mail case held that State
law cannot stop the press from publishing a juvenile's name that it obtained independently of the court.
Although the decision did not hold
that the press should have access
to juvenile court files, it held that if
information regarding a juvenile

case is lawfully obtained by the media, the first amendment interest in
a free press takes precedence over
the interests in preserving the anonymity of juvenile defendants.
Schall v. Martin
467 U.S. 253, 104 S.Ct. 2403 (1984)

Gregory Martin, age 14, was arrested in 1977 and charged with robbery, assault, and possession of a
weapon. He and two other youth allegedly hit a boy on the head with a
loaded gun and stole his jacket and
sneakers.
Martin was held pending adjudication because the court found there
was a "serious risk" that he would
commit another crime if released.
Martin's attorney filed a habeas corpus action challenging the fundamental fairness of preventive detention. The lower appellate courts
reversed the juvenile court's detention order, arguing in part that pretrial detention is essentially punishment because many juveniles
detained before trial are released
before, or immediately after,
adjudication.
The U.S. Supreme Court upheld the
constitutionality of the preventive
detention statute. The Court stated
that preventive detention serves a
legitimate State objective in protecting both the juvenile and society
from pretrial crime and is not intended to punish the juvenile. The
Court found there were enough procedures in place to protect juveniles
from wrongful deprivation of liberty.
The protections were provided by
notice, a statement of the facts and
reasons for detention, and a probable cause hearing within a short
time. The Court also reasserted the
parens patriae interests of the State
in promoting the welfare of children.
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State statutes defiue who is under the jurisdiction of
juvenile court

State statutes define age limits
for the original jurisdiction of the
juvenile court
In most States, the juvenile court
has original jurisdiction over all
youth charged with a law violation
who were below the age of 18 at the
time of the offense, arrest, or referral to court. Since 1975, four States
have changed their age criteria: Alabama increased its upper age from
15 to 16 in 1976 and to 17 in 1977;
Wyoming reduced its upper age
from 18 to 17 in 1993; and New
Hampshire and Wisconsin lowered
their upper age from 17 to 16 in
1996.
Oldest age for original juvenile court jurisdiction in delinquency matters:
Age State
15 Connecticut, New York, North
Carolina
16 Georgia, Illinois, Louisiana, Massachusetts, Michigan, Missouri,
New Hampshire, South Carolina,
Texas, Wisconsin
17 Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Delaware, District of Columbia,
Florida, Hawaii, Idaho, Indiana,
Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Maine,
Maryland, Minnesota, Mississippi ,
Montana, Nebraska, Nevada,
New Jersey, New Mexico, North
Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon,
Pennsylvania, Rhode Island,
South Dakota, Tennessee, Utah,
Vermont, Virginia, Washington,
West Virginia, Wyoming
Many States have higher upper ages
of juvenile court jurisdiction in status offense, abuse, neglect, or dependency matters-typically
through age 20.
In many States, the juvenile court
has original jurisdiction over young
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adults who committed offenses while
juveniles . Many States exclude married or otherwise emancipated juveniles from juvenile court jurisdiction.
Many States have statutory exceptions to basic age criteria. The exceptions, related to the youth's age,
alleged offense, and/or prior court
history, place certain youth under
the original jurisdiction of the criminal court. In some States, a combination of the youth's age, offense,
and prior record places the youth
under the original jurisdiction of
both the juvenile and criminal
courts. In these situations where juvenile and criminal courts have concurrent jurisdiction, the prosecutor
has the authority to decide which
court will initially handle the case.

Statutes in 16 States determine
the lowest age of juvenile court
delinquency jurisdiction
Youngest age for original juvenile court
jurisdiction in delinquency matters:
Age State
6 North Carolina
7 Maryland, Massachusetts,
New York
8 Arizona
10 Arkansas, Colorado, Kansas,
Louisiana, Minnesota, Mississippi, Pennsylvania, South Dakota, Texas, Vermont, Wisconsin

In most States, juvenile court
authority over a youth may
extend beyond the upper age
of original jurisdiction
Through extended jurisdiction
mechanisms, legislatures enable the
court to provide sanctions and services for a duration of time that is in
the best interests of the juvenile and

the public, even for older juveniles
who have reached the age at which
original juvenile court jurisdiction
ends .
Oldest age over which the juvenile
court may retain jurisdiction for disposition purposes in delinquency matters:
Age State
17 Arizona*, North Carolina
18 Alaska, Iowa, Kentucky, Nebraska, Oklahoma, Tennessee
19 Mississippi, North Dakota
20 Alabama, Arkansas, Connecticut,
Delaware, District of Columbia,
Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Illinois,
Indiana, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan,
Minnesota, Missouri, Nevada,
New Hampshire, New Mexico,
New York, Ohio, Pennsylvania,
Rhode Island, South Carolina,
South Dakota, Texas, Utah, Vermont, Virginia, Washington , West
Virginia, Wyoming
22 Kansas
24 California, Montana, Oregon, Wisconsin
Colorado, Hawaii, New Jersey
• Arizona statute extends jurisdiction through
age 20, but a 1979 State Supreme Court decision held that juvenile court jurisdiction terminates at age 18.
**Until the full term of the disposition order.
Note: Extended jurisdiction may be restricted
to certain offenses or juveniles.

In some States, the juvenile court
may impose adult correctional sanctions on certain adjudicated delinquents that extend the term of confinement well beyond the upper age
of juvenile jurisdiction. Such sentencing options are included in the
set of dispositional options known
as "blended sentencing."
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The juvenile justice system differs from the criminal
justice system, but there is common ground

The juvenile justice system
grew out of the criminal
justice system
After working within the criminal
justice system, designers of the
juvenile justice system retained
many of the components of the
criminal justice system as they constructed a new process to respond

to delinquent youth. An understanding of what was retained and what
was changed helps to make clear
the basic differences between the
two systems as they exist today.

philosophy. Recently, there has
been some discussion about the
possibility of essentially merging
the juvenile and criminal systems.
An understanding of similarities and
differences between the two systems is valuable in assessing the
implications of the proposed
changes.

During its nearly 100-year history,
the juvenile justice system in the
U.S. has seen fundamental changes
in certain aspects of process and

Although the juvenile and criminal justice systems are more alike in some jurisdictions than in others,
generalizations can be made about the distinctions between the two systems and about their common
ground
Juvenile justice system

Common ground

I

Criminal justice system

Operating Assumptions

•
•
•

Youth behavior is malleable.
Rehabilitation is usually a viable
goal.
Youth are in families and not
independent.

•
•
•

Community protection is a primary
goal.

•

Sanctions should be proportional
to the offense.

Law violators must be held
accountable.

•

General deterrence works.

Constitutional rights apply.

•

Rehabilitation is not a primary
goal.

Prevention
•

Many specific delinquency prevention activities (e.g., school, church,
recreation) are used.

•

Prevention is intended to change
individual behavior and is often focused on reducing risk factors and
increasing protective factors in the
individual, family, and
community.

•

Educational approaches are taken
to specific behaviors (drunk driving, drug use).

•

Prevention activities are generalized and are aimed at deterrence
(e.g., Crime Watch).

Law Enforcement
•

Specialized "juvenile" units are
used.

•

Jurisdiction involves the full range
of criminal behavior.

•

Open public access to all information is required.

•

Some additional behaviors are
prohibited (truancy, running away,
curfew violations).

•

Constitutional and procedural
safeguards exist.

•

•

•

Some limitations are placed on
public access to information.

•

A significant number of youth are
diverted away from the juvenile
justice system, often into alternative programs.

Both reactive and proactive approaches (targeted at offense
types, neighborhoods, etc.) are
used.

Law enforcement exercises discretion to divert offenders out of
the criminal justice system.

•

Community policing strategies are
employed.

10
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Juvenile justice system

•

In many instances, juvenile court
intake, not the prosecutor, decides
what cases to file.

•

The decision to file a petition for
court action is based on both
social and legal factors.

•

A significant portion of cases are
diverted from formal case
processing.

•

Intake or the prosecutor diverts
cases from formal processing to
services operated by the juvenile
court, prosecutor's office, or outside agencies.

Common ground

•
•

Probable cause must be
established.
The prosecutor acts on behalf of
the State.

•

Plea bargaining is common .

•

The prosecution decision is based
largely on legal facts.

•

Prosecution is valuable in building
history for subsequent offenses.

•

Prosecution exercises discretion
to withhold charges or divert offenders out of the criminal justice
system .

•

Accused individuals have the right
to apply for bond/bail release .

•
•

Defendants have a constitutional
right to a jury trial.

Detention-Jail/lockup
•

Juveniles may be detained for their
own protection or the community's
protection.

•

Accused offenders may be held in
custody to ensure their appearance in court.

•

Juveniles may not be confined
with adults unless there is "sight
and sound separation."

•

Detention alternatives of home or
electronic detention are used.

Adjudication-Conviction

•
•
•

Juvenile court proceedings are
"quasi-civil" (not criminal) and may
be confidential.
If guilt is established, the youth is
adjudicated delinquent regardless
of offense.
Right to jury trial is not afforded in
all States.
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•
•
•
•

Standard of "proof beyond a reasonable doubr is required.
Rights to be represented by an attorney, to confront witnesses, and
to remain silent are afforded.
Appeals to a higher court are
allowed.

•

Guilt must be established on individual offenses charged for
conviction.
All proceedings are open .

Experimentation with specialized
courts (i.e., drug courts, gun
courts) is under way.

11

Juvenile justice system

•

Disposition decisions are based
on individual and social factors,
offense severity, and youth's
offense history.

•

Dispositional philosophy includes
a significant rehabilitation
component.

•

Many dispositional alternatives
are operated by the juvenile court.

•

Dispositions cover a wide range of
community-based and residential
serv1ces.

•

Disposition orders may be directed to people other than the offender (e.g., parents).

•

Disposition may be indeterminate,
based on progress demonstrated
by the youth.

Common ground

Criminal justice system

Decisions are influenced by current offense, offending history, and
social factors.

•

Sentencing decisions are bound
primarily by the severity of the current offense and by the offender's
criminal history.

•

Decisions hold offenders
accountable.

•

•

Decisions may give consideration
to victims (e.g., restitution and "no
contact" orders).

Sentencing philosophy is based
largely on proportionality and
punishment.

•

•

Decisions may not be cruel or
unusual.

Sentence is often determinate,
based on offense.

•

Function is primarily surveillance
and reporting to monitor illicit
behavior.

Aftercare-Parole
•

12

Function combines surveillance
and reintegration activities (e.g.,
family, school, work).

•

The behavior of individuals released from correctional settings is
monitored.

•

Violation of conditions can result
in reincarceration.
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All States allow juveniles to be tried as adults in
criminal court under certain circumstances

Transferring juveniles to criminal
court is not a new phenomenon

In some States, provisions that enabled transfer of certain juveniles to
criminal court were in place before
the 1920's. Other States have permitted transfers since at least the
1940's. For many years, all States
have had at least one provision for
trying certain youth of juvenile age
as adults in criminal court. Such
provisions are typically limited by
age and offense criteria. Transfer
mechanisms vary regarding where
the responsibility for transfer decisionmaking lies.
Transfer provisions fall into three
general categories:
Judicial waiver: The juvenile court
judge has the authority to waive juvenile court jurisdiction and transfer the case to criminal court. States
may use terms other than judicial
waiver. Some call the process certification, remand, or bind over for
criminal prosecution. Others transfer or decline rather than waive
jurisdiction.
Concurrent jurisdiction: Original jurisdiction for certain cases is shared
by both criminal and juvenile
courts, and the prosecutor has discretion to file such cases in either
court. Transfer under concurrent jurisdiction provisions is also known
as prosecutorial waiver, prosecutor
discretion, or direct file.
Statutory exclusion: State statute
excludes certain juvenile offenders
from juvenile court jurisdiction. Under statutory exclusion provisions,
cases originate in criminal rather
than juvenile court. Statutory exclusion is also known as legislative
exclusion.
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Most States have a combination of transfer provisions
Judicial waiver
Discretionary Presumptive Mandatory
Total number
of States:
Alabama
Alaska
Arizona
Arkansas
California
Colorado
Connecticut
Delaware
Dist. of Columbia
Florida
Georgia
Hawaii
Idaho
Illinois
Indiana
Iowa
Kansas
Kentucky
Louisiana
Maine
Maryland
Massachusetts
Michigan
Minnesota
Mississippi
Missouri
Montana
Nebraska
Nevada
New Hampshire
New Jersey
New Mexico
New York
North Carolina
North Dakota
Ohio
Oklahoma
Oregon
Pennsylvania
Rhode Island
South Carolina
South Dakota
Tennessee
Texas
Utah
Vermont
Virginia
Washington
West Virginia
Wisconsin
Wyoming

•

46

•••
•••
••
••
••
••
••
••
••
••
••
•
••
•

••
•••
••
••
••
••
•••
••

15

••
••

•
•
•

14

••
•

••
••

•

Statutory
exclusion

Reverse
waiver

15

28

23

31

••
•
••
•
•
••

••

•••
•

••
•

••

••

•

Concurrent
jurisdiction

Once an
adult/
always an
adult

•
•

•

••

•

•••

•
••
••
••
•
••
••
•
•
••
••
•
••
••
•
•

••
••
•
•

•
•
•
•
••

•
••
•
•••
••

••

•
•
•
••
•
••
•••
•
••
••
••
•••
••
•

••
••
••
•

In States with a combination of transfer mechanisms, the exclusion, mandatory waiver, or concurrent jurisdiction provisions generally target the oldest juveniles and/or those charged with the most
serious offenses, while those charged with relatively less serious offenses and/or younger juveniles may be eligible for discretionary waiver.

Source: Authors' adaptation of Torbet and Szymanski's State legislative responses to violent juvenile crime: 1996-97 update.
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Many States have changed the
boundaries of juvenile court
jurisdiction

Traditionally, discretionary judicial
waiver was the transfer mechanism
on which most States relied. Beginning in the 1970's and continuing
through the present, however, State
legislatures have increasingly
moved juvenile offenders into criminal court based on age and/or offense seriousness, without the casespecific consideration offered by
the discretionary juvenile court judicial waiver process.
State transfer provisions changed
extensively in the 1990's. From 1992
through 1997, all but six States enacted or expanded transfer provisions. An increasing number of State
legislatures have enacted mandatory waiver or exclusion statutes.
Less common, then and now, are
concurrent jurisdiction provisions.
In most States, juveniles
convicted in criminal court
cannot be tried in juvenile court
for subsequent offenses

In 31 States, juveniles who have
been tried as adults must be prosecuted in criminal court for any subsequent offenses. Nearly all of these

14

"once an adult/always an adult" provisions require that the youth must
have been convicted of the offenses
that triggered the initial criminal
prosecution.
Judicial waiver is the most
common transfer provision

In all States except Nebraska, New
Mexico, and New York, juvenile
court judges may waive jurisdiction
over certain cases and transfer
them to criminal court. Such action
is usually in response to a request
by the prosecutor; in several States,
however, juveniles or their parents
may request judicial waiver. In most
States, statutes limit waiver by age
and offense.
Waiver provisions vary in terms of
the degree of decisionmaking flexibility allowed. Under some waiver
provisions, the decision is entirely
discretionary. Under others, there is
a rebuttable presumption in favor of
waiver. Under others, waiver is mandatory once the juvenile court judge
determines that certain statutory
criteria have been met. Mandatory
waiver provisions are distinguished
from statutory exclusion provisions
in that the case originates in juvenile rather than criminal court.

Statutes establish waiver criteria
other than age and offense

In some States, waiver provisions
target youth charged with offenses
involving firearms or other weapons. Most State statutes also limit
judicial waiver to juveniles who are
"no longer amenable to treatment."
The specific factors that determine
lack of amenability vary, but typically include the juvenile's offense
history and previous dispositional
outcomes. Such amenability criteria
are generally not included in statutory exclusion or concurrent jurisdiction provisions.
Many statutes instruct juvenile
courts to consider other factors
when making waiver decisions, such
as the availability of dispositional alternatives for treating the juvenile,
the time available for sanctions,
public safety, and the best interests
of the child. The waiver process
must also adhere to certain constitutional principles of fairness (see
Supreme Court decisions earlier in
this Bulletin).
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In most States, juvenile court judges can waive juvenile court jurisdiction over certain cases and
transfer them to criminal court

State
Alabama
Alaska
Arizona
Arkansas
California
Colorado
Connecticut
Delaware
Dis!. of Columbia
Florida
Georgia
Hawaii
Idaho
Illinois
Indiana
Iowa
Kansas
Kentucky
Louisiana
Maine
Maryland
Michigan
Minnesota
Mississippi
Missouri
Montana
Nevada
New Hampshire
New Jersey
North Carolina
North Dakota
Ohio
Oklahoma
Oregon
Pennsylvania
Rhode Island
South Carolina
South Dakota
Tennessee
Texas
Utah
Vermont
Virginia
Washington
West Virginia
Wisconsin
Wyoming

Minimum
age for
judicial
waiver
14
NS
NS
14
14
12
14
NS
NS
14
13
NS
NS
13
NS
14
10
14
14
NS
NS
14
14
13
12
NS
14
13
14
13
14
14
NS
NS
14
NS
NS
NS
NS
14
14
10
14
NS
NS
14
13

Any
criminal
offense

Judicial waiver offense and minimum age criteria, 1997
Certain
Certain
Certain
person
property
drug
Certain
Capital
Murder
offenses
offenses
offenses
felonies
crimes

-.. ..
..
..
..- ..
..... ..-- .. ..
..-

..
...
..
llmJI

B1l

llmJI

llmJI

or.

llmJI

Ell

1101

II

Certain
weapon
offenses

ItI

011

IIIII

10'1

IIIII

tm1l

....
..
..
.... .... .... .. ..
.. .. ..
.. .... ..
..
llmJI
llmJI

llmJI

IIIII

11m

B1l

llmJI

IIIII

IIIII

IIDI
IIIII

llmJI

IIIII
llmJI

B1l

IIIII

m1ll

Ell

IDII

llmJI

mil
IIIII

llmJI
IIIII

Examples: Alabama allows waiver for any delinquency (criminal) offense involving a juvenile age 14 or older. Arizona allows waiver for any juvenile charged with a felony. New Jersey allows waiver for juveniles age 14 or older who are charged with murder or certain person, property,
drug, or weapon offenses. In New Jersey, juveniles age 14 or older who have prior adjudications or convictions for certain offenses can be
waived regardless of the current offense.
Note: Ages in minimum age column may not apply to all offense restrictions, but represent the youngest possible age at which a juvenile may
be judicially waived to criminal court. "NS" indicates that in at least one of the offense restrictions indicated, no minimum age is specified.
aonly if committed while escaping from specified juvenile facilities.
conly if committed while in custody.

bRequires prior adjudication(s) or conviction(s), which may be
required to have been for the same or a more serious offense type.

Sources: Authors' adaptation of Griffin et al .'s Trying juveniles as adults in criminal court: An analysis of State transfer provisions.
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Few States allow prosecutorial
discretion, but many juveniles
are tried as adults in this way

As of the end of the 1997 legislative
session, 15 States had concurrent
jurisdiction provisions, which gave
both juvenile court and criminal
court original jurisdiction in certain
cases. Thus, prosecutors have discretion to file such cases in either
court.
State appellate courts have taken
the view that prosecutor discretion

is equivalent to the routine charging decisions made in criminal
cases. Thus, prosecutorial transfer
is considered an "executive function," which is not subject to judicial review and is not required to
meet the due process standards
established in Kent. Some States,
however, have written prosecutorial
transfer guidelines.
Concurrent jurisdiction is typically
limited by age and offense criteria.
Often concurrent jurisdiction is limited to cases involving serious, vio-

lent, or repeat crimes or offenses involving firearms or other weapons.
Juvenile and criminal courts often
also share Jurisdiction over minor
offenses such as traffic, watercraft,
or local ordinance violations.
There are no national data at the
present time on the number of juvenile cases tried in criminal court under concurrent jurisdiction provisions. Florida alone reports an
average of nearly 5,000 such transfers per year.

In States with concurrent jurisdiction, the prosecutor has discretion to file certain cases, generally
involving juveniles charged with serious offenses, in either criminal court or juvenile court

State

Minimum
age for
concurrent
jurisdiction

Arizona

14

Arkansas

14

Colorado

14

Dist. of Columbia

16

Florida

NS

Georgia

NS

Louisiana

15

Massachusetts

14

Michigan

14

Montana

12

Nebraska

NS

Oklahoma

15

Vermont

16

Virginia

14

Wyoming

14

Any
criminal
offense

Concurrent jurisdiction offense and minimum age criteria, 1997
Certain
Certain
Certain
drug
person
property
Certain
Capital
offenses
Murder
offenses
offenses
felonies
crimes

Certain
weapon
offenses

.... .. .. .. .. ..
.. .. .. .... .... .... .. ..
.. .. .. .. .. ..
....
.... .... .. .. ..
.. ..
Ell

lmll

lmll

Examples: In Arizona, prosecutors have discretion to file directly in criminal court those cases involving juveniles age 14 or older charged
with certain felonies (defined in State statutes). In Florida, prosecutors may "direct file" cases involving juveniles age 16 or older charged
with a misdemeanor (if they have a prior adjudication) or a felony offense, as well as those age 14 or older charge1d with murder or certain
person, property, or weapon offenses; no minimum age is specified for cases in which a grand jury indicts a juvenile for a capital offense.
Note: Ages in minimum age column may not apply to all offense restrictions, but represent the youngest possible age at which a juvenile
may be filed directly in criminal court. "NS" indicates that in at least one of the offense restrictions indicated, no minimum age is specified.
aApplies to misdemeanors and requires prior adjudication(s), which may be
required to have been for the same or a more serious offense type.

bRequires grand jury indictment.
cAppli es to misdemeanors.

Source: Authors' adap tation of Griffin eta I.'s Trying juveniles as adults in criminal court: An analysis of State transfer provisions.
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Statutory exclusion accounts for
the largest number of juveniles
tried as adults in criminal court

Legislatures "transfer" large numbers of young offenders to criminal
court by enacting statutes that exclude certain cases from juvenile
court jurisdiction. As of the end of
the 19971egislative session, 28
States had statutory exclusions. Although not typically thought of as
transfers, large numbers of youth
under age 18 are tried as adults in
the 13 States where the upper age of
juvenile court jurisdiction is 15 or
16. If the 1.8 million 16- and 17-yearolds in these 13 States are referred
to criminal court at the same rate
that 16- and 17-year-olds are referred to juvenile court in other
States, then as many as 218,000

cases involving youth under the age
of 18 could have faced trial in criminal court in 1996 because the offenders were defined as adults under
State laws.
Many States exclude certain serious
offenses from juvenile court jurisdiction. State laws typically also set
age limits for excluded offenses.
The offenses most often excluded
are capital crimes and murders, and
other serious offenses against persons. Some States exclude juveniles
charged with felonies if they have
prior felony adjudications or convictions. Minor offenses, such as traffic, watercraft, fish, or game violations, are often excluded from
juvenile court jurisdiction in States
where they are not covered by concurrent jurisdiction provisions.

Criminal courts may transfer
cases to Juvenile court or order
juvenile sanctions

Of the 35 States with statutory exclusion or concurrent jurisdiction
provisions, 20 also have provisions
for transferring "excluded" or "direct filed" cases from criminal court
to juvenile court under certain circumstances. This procedure is
sometimes referred to as "reverse"
waiver or transfer. In some States,
juveniles tried as adults in criminal
court may be transferred to juvenile
court for disposition. Some States
allow juveniles tried as adults in
criminal court to receive dispositions involving either criminal or juvenile court sanctions, under what
have come to be known as "blended
sentencing" provisions.

In most States, no minimum age is specified in at least one judicial waiver, concurrent jurisdiction, or
statutory exclusion provision for transferring juveniles to criminal court
Minimum transfer age indicated in section(s) of juvenile code specifying transfer provisions, 1997
No minimum age
Alaska
Arizona
Delaware
Dist. of Columbia
Florida
Georgia*
Hawaii
Idaho*
Indiana
Maine
Maryland
Nebraska

Nevada*
Oklahoma*
Oregon*
Pennsylvania
Rhode Island
South Carolina
South Dakota
Tennessee
Washington*
West Virginia
Wisconsin

10

12

Kansas
Vermont

Colorado
Missouri
Montana

13
Illinois
Mississippi
New Hampshire
New York
North Carolina
Wyoming

14
Alabama
Arkansas
California
Connecticut
Iowa
Kentucky
Louisiana
Massachusetts
Michigan
Minnesota
New Jersey
North Dakota
Ohio
Texas
Utah
Virginia

15

New Mexico

*Other sections of State statute specify an age below which children cannot be tried in criminal court. This minimum age for criminal responsibility is 14 in Idaho, 12 in Georgia, 8 in Nevada and Washington, and 7 in Oklahoma. In Washington , 8- to 12-year-olds are presumed to be
incapable of committing a crime. In Oklahoma, in cases involving 7- to 14-year-olds, the State must prove that at the time of the act, the child
knew it was wrong .
Source: Authors' adaptation of Griffin et al .'s Trying juveniles as adults in criminal court: An analysis of State transfer provisions.
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In States with statutory exclusion provisions, certain cases involving juveniles originate in criminal
court rather than juvenile court

State

Minimum
age for
statutory
exclusion

Alabama

16

Alaska

16

Arizona

15

Delaware

15

Florida

NS

Georgia

13

Idaho

14

Illinois

13

Indiana

16

Iowa

16

Louisiana

15

Maryland

14

Massachusetts

14

Minnesota

16

Mississippi

13

Montana

17

Nevada

NS

New Mexico

15

New York

13

Oklahoma

13

Oregon

15

Pennsylvania

NS

South Carolina

16

South Dakota

16

Utah

16

Vermont

14

Washington

16

Wisconsin

NS

Statutory exclusion offense and minimum age criteria, 1997
Any
criminal
offense

Certain
person
offenses

Certain
property
offenses

Certain
drug
offenses

Certain
weapon
offenses

.. .. .. .. ..
..
...
.. .... .... .... ....
.. ..
..
.. .. .. .. .. .. ..
.... .... ..
.. ..
.. .. ..

Certain
felonies

Capital
crimes

Murder

Ell

IIIII

&'11

Ell

IIIII

&II

IIIII

Ell

Ell

IIIII

IIIII

IIIII

Ell

11111

EEl

IIIII

IIIII IIIII

Examples: In Delaware, juveniles age 15 or older charged with certain felonies must be tried as adults. In Arizona, juveniles age 15 or older
must be tried as adults if they are charged with murder or certain person offenses or .they have prior felony adjudications and are charged with
a felony.
Note: Ages in minimum age column may not apply to all offense restrictions, but represent the youngest possible age at which a juvenile
may be excluded from juvenile court. "NS" indicates that in at least one of the offense restrictions indicated, no minimum age is specified.
aRequires prior adjudication(s) or conviction(s), which may be required to have been for the same or a more serious offense type.
bonly escape or bail violation while subject to prosecution in criminal court.
dRequires prior commitment in a secure facility.
8 0nly if charged while confined or on probation or parole.
cRequires grand jury indictment.
Sources : Authors' adaptation of Griffin et al.'s Trying juveniles as adults in criminal court: An analysis of State transfer provisions.
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New laws have had a dramatic impact on sentencing
for serious or violent juvenile offenders

A trend away from traditional
juvenile dispositions is emerging
Juvenile court dispositions were traditionally based on the offender's individual characteristics and situation. Dispositions were frequently
indeterminate and generally had rehabilitation as a primary goal. As
many States have shifted the purpose of juvenile court away from rehabilitation and toward punishment,
accountability, and public safety, the
emerging trend is toward dispositions based more on the offense
than the offender. Offense-based
dispositions tend to be determinate
and proportional to the offense; retribution and deterrence replace rehabilitation as the primary goal.

Many State legislatures have
changed disposition and
sentencing options
From 1992 through 1997, statutes requiring mandatory minimum periods of incarceration for certain violent or serious offenders were added
or modified in 16 States.

Blended sentencing options create a "middle ground" between
traditional juvenile sanctions and adult sanctions
Blended sentencing option
Juvenile-exclusive blend: The juvenile court may impose
a sanction involving either the juvenile or adult correctional
systems.

Perhaps the most dramatic change
will result from "blended sentences."
Blended sentencing statutes, which
allow courts to impose juvenile and/
or adult correctional sanctions on
certain young offenders, were in
place in 20 States at the end of 1997.
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New Mexico

~ Juvenile

Juvenile court ~
Adult
Juvenile-inclusive blend: The juvenile court may impose
both juvenile and adult correctional sanctions. The adult
sanction is suspended pending a violation and revocation.
~ Juvenile

Connecticut
Kansas
Minnesota
Montana

Juvenile court ~
Adult
Juvenile-contiguous blend: The juvenile court may
impose a juvenile correctional sanction that may remain
in force after the offender is beyond the age of the court's
extended jurisdiction, at which point the offender may be
transferred to the adult correctional system .

Juvenile court - - Juvenile -

Criminal court

Colorado 1
Massachusetts
Rhode Island
South Carolina
Texas

Adult

Criminal-exclusive blend: The criminal court may impose
a sanction involving either the juvenile or adult correctional

systems.
States have also raised the maximum age of the ju_venile court's continuing jurisdiction over juvenile offenders. Such laws allow juvenile
courts to order dispositions that extend beyond the upper age of original jurisdiction, most often to age
21. From 1992 through 1997, 17
States extended their age limit for
delinquency dispositions.

State

Juvenile

~

Adult

Criminal-Inclusive blend: The criminal court may impose
both juvenile and adult correctional sanctions. The adult
sanction is suspended, but is reinstated if the terms of the
juvenile sanction are violated and revoked .

California
Colorado 2
Florida
Idaho
Michigan
Oklahoma
Virginia
West Virginia
Arkansas
Iowa
Missouri
Virginia3

~ Juvenile

Criminal court ~
Adult
Note: Blends apply to a subset of juveniles specified by State statute.
1

Applies to those designated as "aggravated juvenile offenders."
Applies to those designated as "youthful offenders."
3
Applies to those designated as "violent juvenile felony offenders."

2

Source: Authors' adaptation of Tarbet and Szymanski's State legislative responses to
violent juvenile crime: 1996-97 update.
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see page 109 of the National Report.

Resources
Answers to frequently asked questions about juvenile
justice statistics as well as periodic updates of data
presented in Juvenile Offenders and Victims: 1999
National Report are available on the Internet in the
OJJDP Statistical Briefing Book, which can be accessed
through the OJJDP home page at www.ojjdp.ncjrs.org
through the JJ Facts & Figures prompt.
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For information on OJJDP
initiatives related to the reduction
of juvenile crime, violence, and
victimization, contact the Juvenile
Justice Clearinghouse (JJC) at
www.ojjdp.ncjrs.org or call 800-638-8736.

Acknowledgments
Juvenile Offenders and Victims: 1999 National
Report, from which this Bulletin is drawn, was

prepared by the National Center for Juvenile Justice (NCJJ). The authors are Howard N. Snyder and
Melissa Sickmund. The National Report benefited
from the assistance of many individuals in addition
to the authors, including staff at NCJJ, the Office of
Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, and
the Juvenile Justice Clearinghouse.

Juvenile Offenders and Victims: 1999 National Report

(NCJ 178257) is available online from the OJJDP Web
site (www.ojjdp.ncjrs.org) under the JJ Facts & Figures
section and the Publications section or can be ordered
from OJJDP's Juvenile Justice Clearinghouse. Send an
e-mail to puborder@ncjrs.org; call 800-638-8736 (select
option 2): or write to the Juvenile Justice Clearinghouse, P.O. Box 6000, Rockville, MD 20849-6000. Be
sure to ask for NCJ 178257.

Points of view or opinions expressed in this document are those of the
authors and do not necessarily represent the official position or policies of
OJJ DP or the U.S. Department of Justice.

The Office of Juo•enile JuJtice and Delinquency Prel'mtion iJ a compollen/ 4 tie Office of Ju.•tice Program.•, which a{,,, inclur)e.• the
Bureau ol JuJtice AJJiJtance, the Bureau of JuJtiu StatiJti,·J, the
Nationai ln.•titufe o( Ju.•tice, and the Office for Victim.• ol Crime.

